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Wills case, it is to be noted that the St. Louis Court of Appeals in two
recent cases,' 0 again said, without qualification, that an inference might not
be based upon an inference to prove a fact. Neither the Wills case nor
the principal case was referred to in the opinions.
The court in the principal case, in holding that the plaintiff's evidence
was sufficient to make a prima facie case, even though the jury might
have to base an inference upon an inference in reaching the ultimate con-
clusion, recognizes the rule set out in the Wills case. It is hoped that in
the future this attitude toward the prohibition of an inference upon an
inference will prevail over the older idea. Regardless of the fact that the
rule against inferences is probably not given any real effect in most cases,
its mere repetition without explanation or basis is bad, and can lead to
nothing but confusion and uncertainty in the law. The limitation prescribed
in the Wills case will insure litigants against inferences based upon evi-
dence which is too remote or speculative, without the necessity of resorting
to the untenable "slogan" that an inference may not be based upon an
inference. The decision in the Wills case and that of the principal case
seem to be in line with other improvements in the application of the rules
of evidence by the Missouri Supreme Court, such as the ruling on expert
testimony in Scanlon v. Kansas City,"' and the elimination of impeachment
of witnesses by reputation for morality in State v. Willi m . 2
J. W. F.
EVIDENCE-PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION-REFUSAL ov Ac-
CUSED TO ANswER QUESTIONS AFTER ARREsT-[Missouri].-Defendant was
indicted for felonious assault but was not found and arrested for more than
a year after the indictment was returned. After his arrest, defendant
refused to answer questions until he consulted his attorney. At the trial,
the chief of police, in response to questions put by the prosecutor, testified
to certain questions which had been asked the defendant after his arrest
and to the defendant's refusal to answer. Defendant was ccnvicted, and on
appeal the court held that while the testimony ought not to have been ad-
mitted, it was not incriminating, and the error was not reversible. On
rehearing, held: reversed, and new trial granted. The introduction in evi-
dence of defendant's statement that he would not talk until he consulted
his lawyer was reversible error as an infringement of defendant's right
against self-incrimination. State v. Dowling.'
may be broken down into a string of inferences, each drawn from former
inferences. 1 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) 434, §41. He says at page
436, "The judicial utterances that sanction the fallacious and impracticable
limitation, originally put forward without authority, must be taken as valid
only for the particular evidentiary facts therein ruled upon." For an analy-
sis of the cases of all jurisdictions, see Note (1935) 95 A. L. R. 162.
10. Mendenhall v. Neyer (Mo. App. 1941) 149 S. W. (2d) 366; Pape v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (Mo. App. 1941) 150 S. W. (2d) 569.
11. (1930) 325 Mo. 125, 28 S. W. (2d) 84.
12. (1935) 337 Mo. 884, 87 S. W. (2d) 175, 100 A. L. R. 1503.
1. (Mo. 1941) 154 S. W. (2d) 749. The first opinion was withdrawn by
the court, but some of the reasoning of that case is given by the court in
the instant case at page 754.
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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
The decision in the instant case, though the facts are simple, raises an
involved question of law. The hearsay rule ordinarily excludes evidence of
assertions made outside of court, because there is no opportunity to test
the grounds of the assertion and the credibility of the witness by cross-
examination in court by the party against whom it is offered. 2 When a
party's own assertions are offered against him, they are called admissions,
and the hearsay rule does not exclude them, because the party cannot com-
plain of lack of opportunity to cross-examine himself before his assertion
is admitted.8 Moreover, statements made in the presence and hearing of
a party may be held to be adopted by him when not denied and are re-
ceivable in evidence as admissions, unless it can be shown that the party
lacked the opportunity or motive to deny them.4
Apart from other considerations, statements adopted by the silence of
accused while under arrest should be admissible in evidence as admissions.
But the Constitution of the United States5 prohibits compulsory self-in-
crimination, and the constitution of every state except Iowa and New Jersey
gives similar protection in the state courts.8 In addition to this constitu-
tional protection, almost all the states have statutes which provide that
the failure of accused to testify shall not be subject to comment.T The
Missouri statute, like some others, contains both provisions.8 The privileges
against giving testimony and against comment on failure to testify are
ordinarily extended to prohibit inferences from failure to testify at a prior
trial or hearing.9 The question in the instant case, however, is whether
the Missouri statute which prohibits either inference or comment "if the
accused shall not avail himself or herself of his or her right to testify"
should be construed to prohibit the introduction of an accused's refusal to
answer questions after arrest but before any formal arraignment. The
Missouri court has regarded the accused's silence after arrest much like
2. 4 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) 3, §1048.
3. Ibid.
4. 4 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) 74, §1071.
5. U. S. Const. Amend. V.
6. 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) 320, §2252. Reeder, Comment
Upon Failure of Accused to Testify (1932) 31 Mich. L. Rev. 40. Article
III, §2 of the Missouri Constitution reads in part: "No person shall be
compelled to testify against himself in a criminal cause."
7. 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) 412, §2272. Reeder, Comment
Upon Failure of Accused to Testify (1932) 31 Mich. L. Rev. 40, 43.
8. R. S. Mo. (1939) §4082: "If the accused shall not avail himself or
herself of his or her right to testify, or of the testimony of the wife or
husband, on the trial in the case, it shall not be construed to affect the
innocence or guilt of the accused, nor shall the same raise any presump-
tion of guilt, nor be referred to by any attorney in the case, nor be con-
sidered by the court or jury before whom the trial takes place."
9. See Note (1930) 68 A. L. R. 1108, 1153, and cases there cited. 8 Wig-
more, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) 418, §2272.
Although Missouri holds otherwise, see State v. Greer (Mo. 1928) 12
S. W. (2d) 87, 90; State v. Pollnow (Mo. 1928) 14 S. W. (2d) 574, 575,
the rule against self-incrimination is said to apply equally to the ordinary
witness, in order to prevent an inference that the criminating fact exists
from the witness's claim of privilege.
19411
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol27/iss1/20
134 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27
a formal claim of privilege, and has held that under such circumstances,
the accused is under no duty to deny, and that his silence accordingly can-
not be proved at the trial.1o While a number of jurisdictions do not accept
this rule,l7 and it has been criticized by an eminent authority,12 so long
as it is the rule in Missouri, it seems that no valid distinction can be drawn
between the accused's mere silence and the fact situation in the principal
case, namely accused's verbal assertion that he would not make any state-
ments until he consulted his attorney.
The principal case was not complicated by any question of comment by
the prosecutor on the defendant's failure to answer questions. Although,
ordinarily, evidence of the accused's silence as giving rise to admissions
and comment by the prosecutor on such evidence are separately stated by
the writers, it is submitted that this demarcation is a difficult one to make
on the facts of the cases. Obviously it would be error to admit comment
on evidence which could be put before the jury only by means of a previous
error. An early Missouri case held that it was not error for the prosecutor
to remark that defendant did not deny his guilt, when accused while under
arrest, as this related to a past transaction, and not to the "failure of
defendant to testify." 8 The reasoning of this case seems to indicate that
the court at that time would have permitted proof of defendant's silence
after arrest, but later Missouri cases have taken a broader view of the
statute and are clearly opposed to this early opinion?14
10. State v. Richardson (1906) 194 Mo. 326, 92 S. W. 649, 654; State v.
Goldfeder (Mo. 1922) 242 S. W. 403, 404; State v. Higgins (1928) 321
Mo. 570, 12 S. W. (2d) 61, 63. See Notes (1932) 80 A. L. R. 1235, 1262,
(1938) 115 A. L. R. 1510, 1517. Courts adopting this rule follow an early
Massachusetts case, Commonwealth v. Kenney (1847) 12 Met. 235, 46 Am.
Dec. 672. The courts not adopting this rule insist that the later Massa-
chusetts cases misconstrued the Kenney case, pointing out that it was not
upon the fact of arrest alone that the evidence was excluded. See Note
(1932) 80 A. L. R. 1235, 1266.
However, where part of the conversation is incriminating and part is
not, the entire conversation may be shown. State v. Capotelli (1926) 316
Mo. 256, 292 S. W. 42, 45; State v. Hardin (1929) 324 Mo. 28, 21 S. W.
(2d) 758, 761; State v. Murphy (1939) 345 Mo. 358, 133 S. W. (2d) 398,
400.
11. A number of jurisdictions hold that the mere fact of arrest is not
sufficient to render the testimony regarding silence of accused inadmissible,
but that such fact deserves consideration in determining whether accused
was afforded an opportunity to deny, and whether he was called upon to
do so. Simmons v. State (1913) 7 Ala. App. 107, 61 So. 466, 467; Pierson
v. Commonwealth (1929) 229 Ky. 584, 17 S. W. (2d) 697, 701. See Notes
(1932) 80 A. L. R. 1255, 1259, (1938) 115 A. L. R. 1510, 1517; 4 Wigmore,
Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) 80, §1072.
12. Wigmore states that the better rule is to allow some flexibility accord-
ing to circumstances. 4 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) 81, §1072.
13. State v. Schmidt (1897) 136 Mo. 644, 38 S. W. 719, 721. Note that
in this case no objection was made at the time and no exceptions saved.
See Note (1930) 68 A. L. R. 1108, 1155.
14. State v. Swisher (1905) 186 Mo. 1, 84 S. W. 911, 913, cited with
approval in Williams v. State (Tex. Cr. App. 1925) 277 S. W. 389. State v.
Mardino (Mo. 1924) 268 S. W. 48, 49; State v. Bowdry (Mo. 1940) 145
S. W. (2d) 127, 129, and cases there cited.
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The court in the instant case, by reaching its decision only after revers-
ing its first opinion on rehearing, illustrates its hesitancy in reversing a
strong case for the state on an error in evidence, the actual effect of which
on the outcome of the case may well be doubted.' 5 There are a number
of decisions in which courts have held that the comment of the prosecutor
on the failure of defendant to testify or proof of defendant's silence while
under arrest does not result in a miscarriage of justice warranting reversal
when defendant's guilt is otherwise clearly established.'8 The American
Law Institute and American Bar Association have adopted resolutions de-
claring that prosecutors should be permitted to comment upon the failure
of accused to testify at the trial'1 Although these resolutions deal with
failure to talk at the trial, rather than while under arrest, as in the in-
stant case, they indicate a tendency to relax the strict protection of the
privilege against self-incrimination. It is significant to note that the number
of states permitting an inference to be drawn from the failure of accused
to testify at the trial is gradually being enlarged.' 8
A. M. E.
INSURANCE-RECOVERY BY BENEFICIARY WHO IS CONVICTED OF VOLUNTARY
MANSLAUGHTER AFTER KILLING INSURED-[Federal].-The wife of the de-
ceased insured, beneficiary of the policies in question, killed her husband
and was convicted of manslaughter. The insurance company filed a bill
of interpleader naming her among the defendants. From the record of the
criminal case the court found that the killing had occurred under circum-
stances amounting to a clear case of common law voluntary manslaughter,
there being no grades or degrees of the crime in Michigan.' Held: the
wrongful and intentional killing of the insured by the beneficiary precludes
15. The court says in the instant case, at page 753: "We think the
record shows that a strong case was made by the State." At page 754,
the court says: "There is no contention that the State's counsel referred
in argument to Dowling's refusal to discuss his whereabouts, or that they
contended his silence was an admission of guilt. In other words, there was
no aggravation of the error * * *"
16. State v. Howard (1890) 102 Mo. 142, 14 S. W. 937, 938; State v.
Murray (1895) 126 Mo. 611, 29 S. W. 700, 702. See State v. Lee (Mo.
1920) 225 S. W. 928, 930, where the court said: "But, even if the statement
aforesaid had not been withdrawn, and defendant's objection thereto had
been overruled, it would not have constituted reversible error in this case.
The evidence heretofore set out is clear and convincing as to defendant's
guilt." Contra, State v. Hogan (Mo. 1923) 252 S. W. 387, 389.
17. For discussion of these proposals, see Reeder, Comment Upon Failure
of Accused to Testify (1932) 31 Mich. L. Rev. 41; Bruce, The Right to
Comment on the Failure of Defendant to Testify (1932) 31 Mich. L. Rev.
226.
18. 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) 412, §2272. See Anderson, The
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination (1940) 74 N. Y. L. Rev. 453, 458.
1. Mich. Stat. Anno. 28. 553, C. L., §16717. The statute simply penalizes
manslaughter, leaving it to be defined by common law.
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